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IS A CORPORATION CAPABLE OF MALICE.
without such act the city had the power. The same thing is neces-
sarily implied in that provision of the constitution which requires
the legislature to "restrict" the power of municipal corporations
"to contract debts, borrow money, loan their credit," &c. But
the answer to this objection that this act made the issuing bf the
cemetery bonds illegal, is this: It appears from the case that the
city had previously purchased the lot and contracted for that mode
of payment. The act of the legislature then could not impair the
obligation of that contract, or defeat the party's right to its spe-
cific performance. The judgment of the County Court must be
reversed and the cause remanded, with directions that the com-
plaint be dismissed.
LEGAL MISCELLANY.
IS A CORPORATION CAPABLE OF MALICE?
The old doctrine, that a corporation aggregate has no soul, and
therefore is incapable of a malicious intention, has been described
by Erle, C. J., as being rather quaint than substantial; and accord-
ingly, in these days, when substance is preferred to form, and utility
to quaintness, it has been held that corporations, especially those of
a trading character, have souls, and may therefore be guilty of
malice. The number and importance of corporate bodies established
for the purposes of trade in modern times, and transacting their
business through the agency of servants, have rendered it necessary
to relax the old rules existing upon the subject, and to extend to
them the maxim "respondeat superior," as if they were private in-
dividuals, the only special limitation ingrafted upon their liability
being, that the act complained of should be within the scope and
purpose of the incorporation. Thus, after being held liable to an
action for a false return to a mandamus, Yarborough vs. The Bank
of England, 16 East, 6; for the negligence of their servants,
Scott vs. The Mayor, &a., of Manchester, 2 H. & Norm. 204; 8
Jur., N. S., part 1, p. 590; for an assault, The -Eastern Counties
Lailway Company vs. Broom, 6 Exch. 814; 15 Jur. part 1, p. 297;
for false imprisonment, Ohilton vs. The London and Croydon
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Railway Company, 16 M. & W. 212; to an indictment for non-
feasance, Beg. vs. The Birmingham and Gloucestershire Railway
Company, 8 Q. B. 223; and for misfeasance, Beg. vs. The Great
North of England Railway Company, 9 Q. B. 315; 10 Jur., part 1,
p. 755, it was decided that an incorporated company might be sued
for a libel contained in a message transmitted by their telegraph,
the company being incorporated for the purpose (inter alia) of
transmitting messages, Whitfield- vs. The South-Eastern Railway
Company, 4 Jur.,- N. S., part 1, p. 688, and that they might also
be guilty of acts maliciously committed with a view to injure indi-
viduals or rival companies; Green vs. The London General Om-
nibus Company, 6 Jur., N. S., part 1, p. 228. In this last cited
case, the declaration in substance alleged that the defendants mali-
ciously placed their omnibuses just before and just behind the omni-
buses of the plaintiff, (he being a carrier of passengers for hire, &c.,)
so as to prevent persons from entering the plaintiff's omnibuses.
Upon demurrer, on the ground that a corporation aggregate could
not be guilty of a malicious intention, the declaration was supported,
and in delivering the judgment of the court, Erle, C. J., said:
"The whole of the acts that are charged against the defendants are
acts connected with the driving of their vehicles; and this is a company
incorporated for the purpose of driving omnibuses, and therefore the
actual things done by the defendants are within the purpose of
their incorporation. Unless they had been wrongfully done, of
course there could be no ground of complaint; but being wrongfully
done, we think clearly the action lies. . . . An action for a
wrong lies against a corporation where the thing done is within the
purpose of the incorporation, and it has been done in such a manner
as to constitute what would be an actionable wrong if done by a
private individual. . . . There are numerous authorities in
support of the principle on whicl we rely, and, I may add, as an
additional reason for our decision, the inconvenience to the public
that would arise if we were to hold that these companies, incorpo-
rated for the purposes of trade, had a restricted limitation put upon
their liability by reason of such incorporation, and were exempt
from responsibility because they intentionally wronged the public.
We think it extremely important, where such companies admit that
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they have in fact intentionally committed a wrong, that the public
should have a remedy against them, and not be driven to an action
against their servants and others whom they have employed, and
who may be entirely incapable of giving the recompense which the
law may award."-Jurist.
NoTE.-That a corporation aggregate may maintain an action for a libel for
words published of them concerning their trade or business, by which they have
suffered special damage, was decided, probably for the first time, in the Trenton
Autual Life and Fire Insurance Company vs. .Perrine, 3 Zabriskie, 402. "It cannot
be denied," observed Chief Justice Green, in delivering the opinion of the court,
"that a corporation may have a character for stability, soundness, and fair dealing,
in the way of its trade or business ; that this character is as essential, nay more so,
to its prosperity and success than that of a private individual; that banks, insu-
rance companies, and money corporations generally, whose operations enter largely
into the business of every community, depend mainly upon their reputation in the
community for their success, and often for their very existence. Nor can it be
denied that the character of corporations is more easily and more deeply affected
by false and malicious allegations than that of private individuals; nor that the
business of a corporation is more prejudiced by an evil name, by distrust of its
responsibility, or of the character of its officers, than that of an individual. If,
then, the reputation of a corporation, and that of its officers, be essential to its
prosperity, if it may suffer pecuniary loss, and even the utter destruction of its
pecuniary interests, from false and malicious representations, why should it not be
entitled to pecuniary redress ?" (p. 408.) It seems, however, to be admitted in
this case, that special damage, directly or naturally from the libel, is necessary to
be shown, and that without such an allegation, an action for a libel or slander
could not be sustained in such a case. "The reason for the distinction," say the
court, "may be found in -the fact that a corporation has not, like an individual,
any character to be affected by the libel, independent of its trade or business."
On the other hand, it has been held recently that an action of libel would lie
against a corporation, for a statement in a report by the president and directors of
the company, to the stockholders, and afterwards published: Thiladelphia, Wilming-
ton, tc., Railroad Co. vs. Quigley, 21 Howard, 202.
An action of libel may be sustained by a partnership for a publication reflective
on their commercial standing. Taylor vs. Church, 1 E. D. Smith, 279; 4 Selden,
452. But no such action will lie by the members of a company or association,
neither being partners nor persons having a community of pecuniary interest,
wherein they could sustain damage, as in the case of a hose company. Giraud vs.
Beach, 3 E. D. Smith, 337.-Wharton'8 Note, 4 Ez., p. 94.
